Texas Senate Bill 8, the 2021 Heartbeat Act, prohibits physicians from performing or inducing an abortion if the physician detected a fetal heartbeat. S.B. 8 does not allow state officials to enforce the law but directs enforcement through “private civil actions” seeking injunctions and damages awards against those who perform or assist with prohibited abortions. Abortion providers may defend themselves by showing that holding them liable would place an “undue burden” on women seeking abortions.

Abortion providers (petitioners) sought pre-enforcement review of S.B. 8 and an injunction barring its enforcement. They sought to certify a class and request an order enjoining all state-court clerks from docketing S.B. 8 cases, and all state-court judges from hearing them. The district court denied motions to dismiss. The Fifth Circuit denied a request for an injunction barring enforcement pending appeal. The petitioners sought injunctive relief in the Supreme Court, which concluded that the filings failed to identify a basis for disturbing the Fifth Circuit’s decision.

On certiorari, the Court held that a pre-enforcement challenge to S.B. 8 under the U.S. Constitution may proceed against certain defendants but not others, without addressing whether S.B. 8 is consistent with the Constitution.

The Eleventh Amendment and sovereign immunity do not allow an action to prevent state-court clerks and judges from enforcing state laws that are contrary to federal law. No Article III “case or controversy” between “adverse litigants” exists between the petitioners and either the clerks or judges. Texas Attorney General Paxton should be dismissed as possessing no enforcement authority in connection with S.B. 8. Even if Paxton had enforcement power, a federal court cannot parlay that authority into an injunction against any unnamed private parties who might pursue S.B. 8 suits. No court may “enjoin the world at large” or purport to enjoin challenged “laws themselves.” Sovereign immunity does not shield executive licensing officials who may take action against the petitioners for violations of Texas’s Health and Safety Code, including S.B. 8. A single private party, Dickson, should be dismissed, given his sworn declarations that he has no intention to file an S.B. 8 suit.

Annotation

Primary Holding

Supreme Court dismisses Texas Heartbeat Act defendants except for executive licensing officials who may take enforcement action against abortion providers for violations of the Act.

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Rollice’s ex-wife called 911. Rollice was in her garage, intoxicated, and would not leave. Three officers responded to the call and spoke with Rollice through the garage’s doorway. Rollice began fidgeting with something in his hands; he appeared nervous. Rollice refused a request for a pat-down. Police body-camera video captured Rollice conversing with the officers as he turned around and walked toward the back of the garage where his tools were hanging. No officer was within six feet of Rollice. The officers state that they ordered Rollice to stop. Rollice kept walking, grabbed a hammer, and turned toward the officers, grasping the hammer’s handle with both hands and pulling it up to shoulder level. The officers backed up, drawing their guns. They yelled at Rollice to drop the hammer. Rollice took steps toward Officer Girdner, raised the hammer behind his head, and took a stance as if he was about to throw the hammer or charge at the officers. Two officers fired their weapons, killing Rollice. Rollice’s estate filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983.

The Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit. The officers did not violate any clearly established law and are shielded by qualified immunity. None of the decisions cited by the Tenth Circuit established that the officers’ conduct was unlawful. Officers engaged in a conversation with Rollice, followed him into a garage at a distance, and did not yell until after he picked up a hammer. Precedent did not “clearly establish” that their conduct was reckless or that their ultimate use of force was unlawful.

Annotation

Primary Holding

Reversing the Tenth Circuit, the Supreme Court holds that officers involved in a fatal shooting are entitled to qualified immunity.

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Union City, California officer Rivas-Villegas responded to a 911 call reporting that a woman and her children were barricaded in a room for fear that Cortesluna, the woman’s boyfriend, was going to hurt them. After confirming that the family had no means of escape, Rivas-Villegas and other officers commanded Cortesluna outside and onto the ground. Officers saw a knife in Cortesluna’s pocket. While Rivas-Villegas and another officer were removing the knife and handcuffing Cortesluna, Rivas-Villegas briefly placed his knee on the side of Cortesluna’s back.

Cortesluna sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging excessive force. The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit. Rivas-Villegas is entitled to qualified immunity because he did not violate clearly established law. Even assuming that controlling Circuit precedent clearly established the law for purposes of section 1983, Ninth Circuit precedent did not give Rivas-Villegas fair notice that he was using excessive force. This is not an obvious case. The officers, in this case, were responding to a serious alleged incident of domestic violence possibly involving a chainsaw and Cortesluna had a knife protruding from his pocket for which he had just previously appeared to reach. Cortesluna does not dispute, that Rivas-Villegas placed his knee on Cortesluna for no more than eight seconds and only on the side of his back near the knife that officers were in the process of retrieving.

Annotation

Primary Holding

Reversing the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court holds that an officer who briefly placed a knee on the back of a suspect is entitled to qualified immunity.

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In 1996, Reeves and some friends went “looking for some robberies ” but their car broke down. Johnson offered to tow their vehicle. After they arrived, Reeves shot Johnson and directed the others to get his money. Reeves bragged that the murder would earn him a gang tattoo; at a party, Reeves mocked pumping a shotgun and the way that Johnson died. Alabama charged Reeves with murder. His appointed attorneys explored possible intellectual disability. They obtained Reeves’ educational, medical, and correctional records and funding to hire a neuropsychologist (Dr.Goff). Reeves was within the “borderline” range of intelligence but had been denied special education services. A psychologist evaluated Reeves and opined that he was not intellectually disabled. Reeves’ attorneys apparently elected to pursue other mitigation strategies. The jury recommended a death sentence.

Reeves unsuccessfully sought state post-conviction relief, alleging that he was intellectually disabled or that counsel should have hired Dr. Goff to develop mitigation. Dr. Goff testified that Reeves was intellectually disabled. The state’s expert administered his own evaluation and concluded that Reeves was not intellectually disabled, noting that Reeves had a leadership role in a drug-dealing group. Although his lawyers were available, Reeves did not call them to testify. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. The federal district court denied habeas relief. The Eleventh Circuit reversed in part, finding that Reeves’s lawyers were constitutionally deficient for not developing evidence of intellectual disability and that this failure might have changed the outcome of the trial.

The Supreme Court reversed. The Alabama court did not violate clearly established federal law in rejecting Reeves’ claim. Counsel’s strategic decisions are entitled to a “strong presumption” of reasonableness. The analysis is “doubly deferential” when a state court has decided that counsel performed adequately. Despite Reeves’ allegations about his lawyers, he offered no evidence from them. Counsel’s efforts to collect Reeves’ records and obtain funding hardly indicates neglect and disinterest. The Alabama court conducted a case-specific analysis and reasonably concluded that the incomplete evidentiary record doomed Reeves’ belated efforts to second-guess his attorneys. The Eleventh Circuit recharacterized its analysis as a “categorical rule” that any prisoner will always lose if he fails to question trial counsel regarding his reasoning.

Annotation

Primary Holding

Supreme Court reverses an Eleventh Circuit grant of habeas relief for a 1996 murder; the Alabama court did not unreasonably apply a categorical rule in evaluating the defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance.

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Arizona voters may cast their ballots on election day in person at a traditional precinct or a “voting center” in their county of residence, may cast an “early ballot” by mail, or may vote in person at an early voting location in each county. Arizonans who vote in person on election day in a county that uses the precinct system must vote in the precinct to which they are assigned based on their address; if a voter votes in the wrong precinct, the vote is not counted. For Arizonans who vote early by mail, Arizona HB 2023 makes it a crime for any person other than a postal worker, an elections official, or a voter’s caregiver, family member, or household member to knowingly collect an early ballot.

A suit under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 52 U.S.C. 10301, challenged Arizona’s refusal to count ballots cast in the wrong precinct and its ballot-collection restriction. The Ninth Circuit invalidated both restrictions. The Supreme Court reversed, characterizing Arizona’s restrictions as “generally applicable time, place, or manner” voting rules and declining to apply the disparate-impact model to displace “the totality of circumstances.” The Court also rejected a “least-restrictive means” analysis as having “the potential to invalidate just about any voting rule.”

The core of section 2(b) is “equally open” voting. Any circumstance that bears on whether voting is equally open and affords equal “opportunity” may be considered. Voting necessarily requires some effort and compliance with rules. Having to identify one’s polling place and travel there to vote does not exceed the “usual burdens of voting.” A rule’s impact on members of different racial or ethnic groups is important but the existence of some disparity does not necessarily mean that a system is not equally open. A procedure that apparently works for 98% or more of voters to whom it applies, minority and non-minority alike, is unlikely to render a system unequally open. The degree to which a voting rule departs from standard practices is relevant. The policy of not counting out-of-precinct ballots is widespread. The strength of the state interests served by a challenged rule is important. Precinct-based voting helps to distribute voters more evenly, can put polling places closer to voter residences, and helps to ensure that each voter receives a ballot that lists only the relevant candidates and public questions. Courts must consider the state’s entire system of voting; a burden associated with one voting option must be evaluated in the context of the other available means.

HB 2023 also passes muster. Arizonans can submit early ballots in several ways. Even if the plaintiffs could demonstrate a disparate burden, Arizona’s “compelling interest in preserving the integrity of its election procedures” would suffice under section 2. Third-party ballot collection can lead to pressure and intimidation and a state may take action to prevent election fraud without waiting for it to occur within its own borders.

Annotation

Primary Holding

Supreme Court upholds Arizona voting rules that discount the votes of those who vote at the wrong precinct and that make it a crime for any person other than a postal worker, an elections official, or a voter’s caregiver, family member, or household member to knowingly collect an early ballot.

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Under the Natural Gas Act, to build an interstate pipeline, a natural gas company must obtain from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) a certificate of “public convenience and necessity,” 15 U.S.C. 717f(e). A 1947 amendment, section 717f(h), authorized certificate holders to exercise the federal eminent domain power. FERC granted PennEast a certificate of public convenience and necessity for a 116-mile pipeline from Pennsylvania to New Jersey. Challenges to that authorization remain pending. PennEast sought to exercise the federal eminent domain power to obtain rights-of-way along the pipeline route, including land in which New Jersey asserts a property interest. New Jersey asserted sovereign immunity. The Third Circuit concluded that PennEast was not authorized to condemn New Jersey’s property.

The Supreme Court reversed, first holding that New Jersey’s appeal is not a collateral attack on the FERC order. Section 717f(h) authorizes FERC certificate holders to condemn all necessary rights-of-way, whether owned by private parties or states, and is consistent with established federal government practice for the construction of infrastructure, whether by government or through a private company.

States may be sued only in limited circumstances: where the state expressly consents; where Congress clearly abrogates the state’s immunity under the Fourteenth Amendment; or if it has implicitly agreed to suit in “the structure of the original Constitution.” The states implicitly consented to private condemnation suits when they ratified the Constitution, including the eminent domain power, which is inextricably intertwined with condemnation authority. Separating the two would diminish the federal eminent domain power, which the states may not do.

Annotation

Primary Holding

The holder of a FERC certificate of public convenience and necessity to build a natural gas pipeline may exercise the federal eminent domain power to obtain necessary rights-of-way.

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The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) reinstated the prior removal orders of aliens who were removed from the U.S. and reentered without authorization. Each alien sought to prevent DHS’s execution of those orders based on fear of returning to their home country. While their withholding-only proceedings were pending, DHS detained the aliens, who sought release on bond. DHS argued that because the aliens were detained under 8 U.S.C. 1231, which mandates detention when a removal order is administratively final, not section 1226, which governs detention pending a decision on whether the alien “is to be removed,” they were not entitled to bond hearings. The Fourth Circuit ruled in favor of the aliens.

The Supreme Court reversed. Section 1231, not 1226, governs the detention of aliens subject to reinstated orders of removal. Here, each alien was “ordered removed” by a valid removal order that was reinstated from the original date under section 1231(a)(5) and was “administratively final.” The possibility of a determination that DHS cannot remove an alien to the specific country designated in the removal order does not render the question of whether the alien is to be removed “pending.” If an immigration judge grants withholding of removal, that order remains in full force; DHS retains the authority to remove the alien to any other authorized country.

The inclusion of the withholding provision in section 1231 illustrates how withholding-only relief fits within the removal process. Section 1226 applies before an alien goes through the removal proceedings and obtains a decision; 1231 applies after. Aliens who have not been ordered removed are less likely to abscond because they have a chance of being found admissible, while aliens who have already been ordered removed are generally inadmissible and have already demonstrated a willingness to violate the terms of a removal order.

Annotation

Primary Holding

Aliens subject to reinstated orders of removal are not entitled to bond hearings while seeking withholding of removal; their removal orders are “administratively final.”

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Truckai invented NovaSure to treat abnormal uterine bleeding using a moisture-permeable applicator head to destroy targeted cells. Truckai filed a patent application and assigned the application and future continuation applications, to his company, Novacept. Novacept and its patents and patent applications were acquired by Hologic. Truckai founded Minerva and developed a supposedly improved device to treat abnormal uterine bleeding, using a moisture-impermeable applicator head to remove cells. The Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) issued a patent; the FDA approved the device for sale. Hologic filed a continuation application, seeking to add claims to its NovaSure patent–one claim encompassed applicator heads generally, without regard to whether they are moisture permeable. The PTO issued the altered patent.

Hologic sued Minerva for infringement. Minerva argued that Hologic’s patent was invalid because the new claim did not match the written description. Hologic invoked the assignor estoppel doctrine: Because Truckai had assigned the original application, he and Minerva could not impeach the patent’s validity. The Federal Circuit agreed.

The Supreme Court vacated. Assignor estoppel is a valid defense, based on the need for consistency in business dealings, but applies only when the assignor’s claim of invalidity contradicts explicit or implicit representations made in assigning the patent. Concerns with the assignor taking contradictory positions do not arise when an assignment occurs before an inventor can make a warranty as to specific claims, such as when an employee assigns to his employer patent rights in future inventions; when a later legal development renders irrelevant the warranty given at the time of assignment; and when a post-assignment change in patent claims can remove the rationale for applying assignor estoppel. The Federal Circuit failed to recognize these boundaries, deeming “irrelevant” the question of whether Hologic had expanded the assigned claims. If Hologic’s new claim is materially broader than what Truckai assigned, Truckai could not have warranted its validity.

Annotation

Primary Holding

Supreme Court defines the boundaries of the “assignor estoppel” defense to a claim of patent invalidity.

The post Minerva Surgical, Inc. v. Hologic, Inc. appeared first on Oregon Press News.

When a business opted into its Name Screen Alert service, TransUnion would conduct its ordinary credit check of the consumer and would also use third-party software to compare the consumer’s name against the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control’s list of terrorists, drug traffickers, and other serious criminals. If the consumer’s first and last name matched the first and last name of an individual on that list, TransUnion would note on the credit report that the consumer’s name was a “potential match.”

A class of 8,185 individuals with such alerts in their credit files sued TransUnion under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. 1681. for failing to use reasonable procedures to ensure the accuracy of their credit files. The parties stipulated that only 1,853 class members had their misleading credit reports containing alerts provided to third parties during the seven-month period specified in the class definition. The Ninth Circuit affirmed a jury verdict, awarding each class member statutory and punitive damages.

The Supreme Court reversed. Only plaintiffs concretely harmed by a defendant’s statutory violation have Article III standing to seek damages in federal court. An injury-in-law is not an injury-in-fact. The asserted harm must have a close relationship to harm traditionally recognized as providing a basis for a lawsuit. Physical or monetary harms and various intangible harms—like reputational harms–qualify as concrete injuries under Article III; 1,853 class members suffered harm with a “close relationship” to the harm associated with the tort of defamation. The credit files of the remaining 6,332 class members contained misleading alerts, but TransUnion did not provide that information to potential creditors. The mere existence of inaccurate information, absent dissemination, traditionally has not provided the basis for a lawsuit. Exposure to the risk that the misleading information would be disseminated in the future, without more, cannot qualify as concrete harm in a suit for damages.

Annotation

Primary Holding

To maintain a suit for damages under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, a consumer must establish a concrete injury-in-fact; a statutory violation, on its own, and the risk of future harm, do not establish standing.

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Plaintiffs owned a tenancy-in-common interest in a multi-unit San Francisco residential building. Until 2013, San Francisco accepted only 200 applications annually for conversion of such arrangements into condominium ownership. A new program allowed owners to seek conversion subject to conditions, including that nonoccupant owners had to offer their existing tenants a lifetime lease. The plaintiffs and their co-owners obtained approval for conversion. The city refused the plaintiffs’ subsequent request that the city either excuse them from executing the lifetime lease or compensate them.

The plaintiffs’ suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleged that the lifetime-lease requirement was an unconstitutional regulatory taking. The district court rejected this claim, citing the Supreme Court’s “Williamson County” holding that certain takings actions are not “ripe” for federal resolution until the plaintiff seeks compensation through state procedures. While an appeal was pending, the Court repudiated that Williamson County requirement. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal, concluding that the plaintiffs had not satisfied the requirement of “finality.”

The Supreme Court vacated. To establish “finality,” a plaintiff need only show that there is no question about how the regulations apply to the land in question. Here, the city’s position is clear: the plaintiffs must execute the lifetime lease or face an “enforcement action.” That position has inflicted a concrete injury. Once the government is committed to a position, the dispute is ripe for judicial resolution. Section 1983 guarantees a federal forum for claims of unconstitutional treatment by state officials. Exhaustion of state remedies is not a prerequisite. While a plaintiff’s failure to properly pursue administrative procedures may render a claim unripe if avenues remain for the government to clarify or change its decision, administrative missteps do not defeat ripeness once the government has adopted its final position. Ordinary finality is sufficient because the Fifth Amendment enjoys “full-fledged constitutional status.”

Annotation

Primary Holding

Exhaustion of state remedies is not a prerequisite to a “takings claim” under 42 U.S.C. 1983; for the limited purpose of ripeness, ordinary finality is sufficient.

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